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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. section 78-2a-3 (2)(k) (Supp. 1994).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are whether the legal
conclusions of the trial court are correct as to the following:
1.

Whether Defendants are liable for conversion of the D-7

Caterpillar and sheepsfoot.
2.

Whether punitive damages should be awarded against

Defendants.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of a trial court's conclusions of law are based on a
correction of error standard, granting no deference to the trial
court.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App.

1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), Lake Philaas v. Valley
Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Attached in Appendix 1 is Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2756.
Attached in Appendix 2 is Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action for the

conversion of a Caterpillar Bulldozer, and of a sheepsfoot which
is an implement used in conjunction with the Caterpillar.
B.

Proceedings Below.

A complaint naming Romona Smith and Fred Smith as Plaintiffs
and Doug Shelly and Domonic Bonino as Defendants was filed on
January 8, 1992,
A complaint naming Romona Smith, Fred Smith, Max Smith, and
Red Z, Inc. as Plaintiffs and Doug Shelly and Domonic Bonino as
Defendants was filed on November 23# 1992.
In August, 1993, the court ordered consolidation of the
cases.
The trial was held in front of Judge David L. Mower on
August 26, 27, 30, September 8 and 9, 1993.
The trial court found in favor of Plaintiffs and issued a
Decision (including Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and an
Order).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts in this matter are undisputed since:

"The

defendants do not contest the Findings of Fact entered by the
trial court as part of it's memorandum decision."

Brief of

Appellants page 21. The following statement of facts is
therefore taken verbatim from the Findings of Fact of the trial
court:
2

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section A.

The parties, witnesses and other

individuals and entities.
1.

All the parties to this action are individuals, except

Red Z, Ins, which is a corporation.(This finding was part of the
parties' stipulation.)
2.

Plaintiff Romona Smith is the mother of plaintiffs J.

Fred Smith and Max L. Smith.
3.

Plaintiffs Romona Smith and Max L. Smith live at the

same residence at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Utah.
4.

Plaintiff J. Fred Smith is president of Red Z, Inc.

He

is also a director and an owner of 50% of the stock.
5.

A business known as Red Z was operated by Plaintiff J.

Fred Smith until it was incorporated as Red Z, Inc. sometime
after 1982.
6.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendant in a

divorce action in this Curt, case number 9726.

A decree of

divorce was entered in that case on September 30, 1990.
Paragraph 25 of that decree reads as follows:
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use and
possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject to all
liability thereon and holding the Plaintiff harmless
therefrom. The Plaintiff is reserved the right to use
said machinery upon twenty-four (24) hours notice to
the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall provide her own
fuel.
7.

Deena C. Smith was and is the Plaintiff in case number

9726, the divorce action.
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8.

Defendants are residents of Sanpete County, Utah.

(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.)
9.

Defendant Domonic Bonino operates a business under the

name of Mountainville Enterprises.
10.

Defendant Doug Shelley operates an excavation business.

He owns property at a place called Sports Haven, which is between
Fairview and Mt. Pleasant in northern Sanpete County.
11.

Charles Cummins, Jr. is the president of Crystal

Mountain Property Owners Association.
12.

David Hansen is assistant manager of Eureka Sales, a

division of Wheeler Machinery Company of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Eureka Sales is in the business of renting, selling and salvaging
construction equipment and machinery.
13.

Larry Anderson is a sales representative of Utah Track

and Welding, Inc. of Salt Lake City, Utah, which is the business
of selling, and repairing construction equipment and machinery.
14.

Otho J. Walker is recently retired from operating a

business known as Walker Construction Company.

Among other

things, it was in the business of construction equipment sales
and repair.
15.

In 1991 Ross Blackham was the County Attorney of

Sanpete County.
Section B.
16.

Description of real and personal property items.

The cause of action arose in Sanpete County, Utah.

(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.)
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17.

Over the last several years plaintiffs J. Fred Smith

and Max L. Smith have been, separately, in the property
development business. They have developed recreational
subdivisions in northern Sanpete County, Utah.

The development

work has included road construction.
18.

In northern Sanpete County there is a parcel known as

Crystal Mountain Subdivision.

This property has also been known

as the Indian Ridge Subdivision.

There is also a parcel known as

Oaker Hills Subdivision.
19.

The Crystal Mountain and Oaker Hills subdivisions are

either contiguous or nearly so.
20.

There exists two pieces of construction equipment, a

Model D-7 Caterpillar bulldozer, vehicle identification number
4T9683, and a sheepsfoot.

(This finding was part of the parties'

stipulation.)
21.

The D-7 Caterpillar which is the subject of this case

is the same one referred to in paragraph 25 of the decree of
divorce in case number 9726.

It is equipped with an in-line 4-

cylinder diesel engine which has two cylinder heads, each
covering two cylinders.

It is an older model, probably

manufactured in 1954.
22.

A sheepsfoot (sometimes called a "tamper") is a road

construction implement.

It is a steel cylinder or drum about 4

feet in diameter and about 6 feet in length, designed to be
filled with water and then dragged behind a bulldozer for soil
compaction.

The outside surface of the drum is covered with
5

metal spikes between 8 and 12 inches in length.

The combined

action of the rolling of the drum and the inserting of the spikes
provides soil compaction.1
Section C.
23.

The events.

The sheepsfoot was purchased by Plaintiff J. Fred Smith

in 1982 and later transferred to Red Z, Inc.
24.

On October 14, 1988 Max L. Smith purchased the D-7

Caterpillar from Walker Construction Company.
part of the parties' stipulation.)

(This finding was

The purchase price,

$5,250.00, was paid by a check signed by Max L. Smith and drawn
on a bank account named "Oaker Hills."
25.

In 1989 both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on the

Oaker Hills Subdivision property.
26.

In June or July of 1990 Mr. Max L. Smith drove the D-7

Caterpillar from the Oaker Hills subdivision property toward the
Crystal Mountain subdivision property.

He never reached his

destination (which was about 2 miles away) because there were
holes in the D-7'S radiator.

When the loss of the coolant caused

the engine to begin overheating, Mr. Smith shut it down.
27.

A couple of days later Mr. Max L. Smith asked a friend

with a motor grader to help move the D-7.

This was done and the

D-7 completed its journey (although not under its own power) to
the Crystal Mountain property.

Exhibit 3 received in evidence at the trial is a copy of
a photograph of a sheepsfoot.
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28.

Mr. Max L. Smith moved the sheepsfoot from Oaker Hills

to Crystal Mountain about 2 weeks later.
29.

The D-7 had suffered a cracked cylinder head as a

result of being operated without coolant.

Consequently, Mr. Max

L. Smith began to disassemble it in order to make the necessary
repairs.

He removed the hood, the radiator, the intake manifold

and the cylinder heads.
30.

During the next several months, some repairs were done.

However, the D-7 was left partially disassembled and covered with
a blue tarp through the winter of 1990-1991.
31.

Plaintiff Romona Smith paid various sums of money for

parts and labor to repair the D-7, as follows:

|| Date
14 Sep 1990
14 Sep 1990

Paid to

Amount

Wheeler
Machinery

$361.25

Northwest
Motor
Welding,
Inc.

$2,552.76

' Purpose
fuel
injectors

|

rebuilt
cylinder
heads and
gasket

|

15 Mar 1991

Virgil
Coombs

$130.00

labor

18 Feb 1991

Ahlander's

$322.58

radiator

18 Feb 1991

Max
Broadhead

$100.00

labor

28 Feb 1991

First
Security
Bank Visa

$2,686.31

3 0 Nov 1990

Don Wood

8 Feb 1991

Virgil
Coombs

7

1

||

cylinder
heads

$300.00

labor

$50.00

labor

||

32.

On July 1, 1991 Mr. Charles Cummins, Jr. sent a letter

to which he had signed his name as chair of the Board of Crystal
Mountain Property Owners Association.
a.

The letter was addressed: Mr. Max Smith a/c Romona
(sic) Smith, 485 W 120 N, Orem, Utah 84057.

b.

This is the text of the letter:

This letter is to advise you that it is our desire to
have the D-7 dozer located on Section "A" common area
of Indian Ridge Subdivision removed as soon as
possible. This equipment has been at the present
location for approximately one year. If this unit is
not removed by July 12, 1991, we will consider it to be
abandoned and will act accordingly.
33.

Mr. Max L. Smith read the letter and asked his mother

to respond.
34.

On July 8, 1991 Plaintiff Mrs. Romona Smith wrote a

letter and signed Max's name to it.

The letter was addressed to:

Crystal Mountain, Property Owners Association, Spanish Fork,
Utah.

Partial text of the letter is:
Dear Sir:
I am very sorry to have left the tractor there so
long. The man that was to have finished fixing
it...moved not telling me where he went...I am trying
to find someone else to do this.
I have four lots there. I know how much you must
want me to get the tractor moved. I will try to do so
real soon.
Thank you so much for your patience of such a long
time.

35.

Mr. Cummins received the response written by Mrs.

Smith.
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36.

On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a

letter addressed

to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant, Ut."

Partial text of the letter is as follows:
Dear Sir:
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut.
37.

Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked

Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to Mr.
Shelley's property.
38.

Mr. Shelley asked Mr. Branch Cox to assist in the

effort, since Mr. Shelley's equipment trailer was not equal to
the task of hauling a piece of equipment of the size and weight
of the D-7.
39.

On August 13, 1991 both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were

in Sanpete County, Utah on property known as Crystal Mountain
Subdivision.

(This finding was part of the parties'

stipulation.)
40.

41.

On August 13, 1991 the D-7 was not operable because
a.

it had no radiator;

b.

the intake manifold was not connected to the
engine block; and

c.

the exhaust stack was detached.

On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelley, assisted by

Mr. Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot from the
Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's property in Sanpete
County, Utah. (This finding was part of the parties'
stipulation.)
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42.

Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Doug Shelley

$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment.

(This finding

was part of the parties' stipulation.)
43.

On September 30, 1991, plaintiffs were in court in

Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr. Berry say,
"...There's already been heavy machinery that's been lost by Mr.
Smith's inattentiveness, and he left a piece, a D7-Cat on a
mountain and it's been taken off the mountain by the State of
Utah; and I'm not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect
it's gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..."
44.

During the first part of October, 1991 defendant

Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's place of
business.

45.

The following conversation occurred:
Smith:

Did you pick up the Cat?
and Max.

It belongs to me

Bonino:

Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee
and you can have it back.

Smith:

I can't afford it. You really ought to call
me Max. He lives with Romona. Here is the
address and telephone number.

On October 12 or 15, 1991 Plaintiff Romona Smith met

with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of business.
The following conversation occurred:
Smith:

You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me.

Bonino:

If you had just come yesterday, it was
sitting right out here in front. I sold it
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage.

Smith:

Who got the money?

Bonino:

I did.
10

46.

Smith:

Who moved it?

Bonino:

Doug Shelley.

Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by

telephone later that same day.

She arranged to meet with him,

which she did the following day at his place of business. Both
the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on Mr. Shelley's property on that
day.
47.

During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred

Smith met with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of
business.

48.

The following conversation occurred:
Smith:

You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z,
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith.
We'll pay you whatever you're into them.

Bonino:

The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham
gave me authority. The equipment has been
disposed of.

On that same day, Plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with

defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of business. The
following conversation occurred:

49.

Smith:

That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot.

Shelley:

I don't think so.

Smith:

I want them back.
Indianola for me?

Will you haul them to

On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf

of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a letter and
mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley.

Partial text of the letter

is as follows:
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your
11

continued possession of those items is wrongful. This
letter is to serve you with written demand to make
arrangements for delivery of those items to the
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m.
50.

Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr.

Bonino.
51.

Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the

sheepsfoot as of the time of trial.
52.

The plaintiffs had never met nor known about the

defendants until after August 13, 1991.
53.

On August 13, 1991 the sheepsfoot was worth $2,800.00

and $0.00.
54.

During 1991 and 1992 the rental value of a sheepsfoot

was $600.00 per month.
55.

In 1991, Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. entered into a contract

with an entity known as Garff Brothers to do road construction
work in Summit County, Utah.
56.

Road construction work in Summit County is seasonal due

to adverse weather conditions.
57.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. could have used the sheepsfoot

during the months of August and September 1991 and May, June,
July, August and September 1992 on the Summit County project.
58.

Plaintiffs filed this action in January of 1992 in

order to regain possession of their property.

They retained

counsel to assist them, and he has assisted them in this case.
His fees are reasonable in the sum of $9,981.25.
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59.

Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the

property from the Sanpete County Attorney.

However, no evidence

regarding such authority was presented.
60.

The number of days between September 30, 1992 and

September 8, 1993 is 344. These facts2 lead the Court to
conclude as follows:
A.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment

against defendants that it is the owner of and is entitled to
possession of the sheepsfoot.

Defendants should be ordered to

deliver possession thereof to it at the property of J. Fred Smith
near Indianola, Utah within 10 days.
B.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgement

against defendants that he is entitled to use and possession of
the D-7 Caterpillar.
10 days.

He should be ordered to deliver it within

Should plaintiff Max L. Smith fail to designate a

delivery location within 30 days, then he forfeits any ownership
claims he might have.
C.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment

against defendants and they should be ordered to pay money to it
as follows:
1.

the sum of $4,800.00 (this sum represents eight
months' rent on the sheepsfoot);

2

The parties' stipulation included one other fact, i.e.,
"Defendant Max L. Smith never paid defendant Romona Smith
any money for use of the D-7 outside of Oaker Hills
subdivision."
The court has not adopted this finding as it was not
useful in resolving any disputed issues.
13

2.

the sum of $5,600.00 (this sum represents double
the value of the sheepsfoot; it is intended as
punitive damages and is imposed to punish
defendants for their willful and malicious acts);

3.

the sum of $ 258.76 (this sum represents prejudgment interest on $4,800.00 from September 30,
1992 to September 8, 1993, calculated as follows:
$4,800.00 times 5.72% times 344 divided by 365).

D.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment

against defendants and they should be ordered to pay to him the
sum of $3,900.00 (this sum represents triple the value of the D-7
as of August 13, 1991; it is intended as punitive damages and is
imposed to punish defendants for their willful and malicious
acts) .
E.

Plaintiffs Red Z, Inc. and Max L. Smith should be

awarded judgment and defendants and they should be ordered to pay
to them the sum of $ 9981.25 (representing attorney's fees).
F.

Defendant should be ordered to pay interest on the

total judgment at the statutory interest rate.
G.

The judgment should be augmented by the amount of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred to collect it.
H.

Plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment of "no cause of

action" against the defendants as to each claim made in their
counterclaim.
Rec. at 355-72.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In their docketing statement, Defendants set forth two
issues which they have neglected to brief.
Supreme Court stated:

The Utah State

"We have long held that where an appellant

fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived."
v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992).

Smith

Issues 7(b) and

7(e) on Defendants' docketing statement are waived for failure to
brief the issues on appeal.
Paragraphs 2 and 6 on page 2 of Appellants' Brief contain
two issues which Defendants did not properly preserve for appeal
on Defendants' docketing statement.

Failing to preserve the

issues in the docketing statement results in Defendants waiving
them for appeal.
Appellants state:

"The Defendants do not contest the

Findings of Fact entered by the trial court as part of it's
memorandum Decision."

Appellants' Brief page 19. Since

Defendants do not contest the trial court's Findings of Facts, it
is assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial
court.

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

Furthermore, since Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence
to attack the trial court's Findings of Fact, the trial court's
Findings of Fact are accepted as valid and to be supported by the
weight of the evidence.

Therefore, an examination of the law

regarding conversion and an application of the law to the trial
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law to the
facts as found by the trial court is necessary.
15

Conversion is:
an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is
deprived of its use and possession.
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951,
959, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App 1993)
To determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that
Defendants converted the D-7 caterpillar and the sheepsfoot, the
trial court must find 3 elements:
1.
2.
3.

an act of wilful interference by Defendants with
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot;
done without lawful justification;
by which Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and
possession of the D-7 and sheepsfoot.

Paragraphs 6, 21, 23, 24, A, and B, in the trial court's
Findings of Facts, Conclusion of Law, and Order support the trial
court's conclusion that ownership, use and possession of the
property were in the Plaintiffs.

Paragraphs 37, 41, 42, and 51

support the trial court's conclusion that Defendants' actions
constituted an act of wilful interference by Defendants with
Plaintiffs' D-7 and sheepsfoot.

Paragraphs 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,

49, and 50 support the trial court's conclusion that Defendants'
actions were without lawful justification.

Paragraphs 53, 54,

55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60 support the trial court's conclusion
that Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot.

The trial court's findings of fact

are supported by the record.
Punitive damages require a showing and finding of acts that
are a result of willful or malicious or intentionally fraudulent
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conduct, or conduct that manifests a reckless indifference toward
the rights of others.

Defendants set forth ten pages of selected

facts from the record and from other documents and cases in an
effort to support their argument that punitive damages are not
warranted in this case.

However, Defendants have failed to

marshall all evidence in favor of the trial court's findings in
order to properly attack the trial court's award of punitive
damages.
In order to attack a trial court's fact findings, "an
appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts
as found by the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d
198, 199 (Utah 1991). If the evidence is not properly
marshalled, we will assume the findings are supported and
proceed to review "the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case." Id.
Lake Philaas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 959
(Utah App. 1993).
Defendants' failure to marshall the facts, and Defendants'
attempt to offer carefully selected facts in their own favor
preclude any attack on the trial court's findings and conclusions
that Defendants acted willfully and maliciously.
Paragraphs 36, 37, 41-51, 59, and A-H support the trial
court's conclusion that Defendants' actions were willful and
malicious, which findings justify punitive damages.

Further, the

above cited findings of the trial court also support the trial
court's award of attorney's fees.

There is also substantial

record evidence supporting the trial court's findings.
Defendants' claim was properly found by the trial court to
be without merit and lacking in good faith.
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Defendants' appeal

is not grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and
does not attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Defendants' appeal is necessarily frivolous, and Plaintiffs are
entitled to recover attorneys fees resulting from Defendants
appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Review of a trial court's conclusions of law are based on a

correction of error standard, granting no deference to the trial
court.

Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App.

1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), Lake Philgas v. Valley
Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993) .
On page 21 of Appellants' Brief, Defendants' indicate as
follows:
The defendants do not contest the findings of fact entered
by the trial court as part of its memorandum decision.
Rather, each of the Defendants challenge the ultimate
conclusions the trial court reached in determining that each
of them is liable for conversion of the property of Max L.
Smith and Red Z. Inc., and the imposition of punitive
damages, costs and attorney fees against them.
Since the Defendants do not contest the findings of fact, it
is assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial
court.

II.

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).

DEFENDANTS HAVE SET FORTH IN THEIR DOCKETING STATEMENT
ISSUES WHICH THEY HAVE NOT BRIEFED ON APPEAL.
In their docketing statement, Defendants preserved two

issues which they have neglected to brief:
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Paragraph 7(b) :
b. Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court erred in
the computation of actual damages against the
defendants.
Paragraph 7(e):
e. Whether the findings and conclusions of the Sixth
Judicial District Court are supported by the evidence
presented at trial.
Neither of these issues have been briefed by Defendants.
Utah State Supreme Court stated:

The

"We have long held that where

an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is
waived."

Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992).

Furthermore, the issue set forth in paragraph "e" would
require a marshalling of the facts; however, Defendants have not
done so.

Because Defendants failed to marshall the facts, and

because these issues were not properly briefed by Defendants,
they are abandoned and will not be addressed by Plaintiffs.
The situation in the case at bar is similar to the situation
in Smith v. Batchelor.

In footnote 4, the court stated:

In its notice of appeal and its second amended
docketing statement, Movie Buffs also claimed that the trial
judge had abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the
summary judgment or to allow it to withdraw or amend the
admissions. However, Movie Buffs failed to brief this issue
before the court. We have long held that where an appellant
fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived.
See, e.g. Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455, 460, 211 P.2d 206,
208 (1949); McFarlane v. Winters, 114 Utah 502, 504, 201
P.2d 494, 495 (1949); see also Pixon v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Therefore, we will not review the trial judge's denial of
Movie Buff's motions.
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992).
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III. APPELLANTS' BRIEF CONTAINS ARGUMENTS ON ISSUES WHICH
DEFENDANTS DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE IN THE DOCKETING
STATEMENT.
Defendants improperly briefed the following issues which
were not properly preserved on appeal:
Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court erred in
concluding the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiffs, Max
L. Smith and Red Z, Inc. when the Plaintiffs did not give
proof of their identities nor proof of ownership of the D-7
Caterpillar and the Sheepsfoot to the Defendants?
Appellants' Brief page 2, paragraph 2.
Whether the Plaintiffs failed to prove a prima facie case of
conversion against the Defendants?
Appellants' Brief page 2, paragraph 6.
By failing to preserve the issues in the docketing
statement, Defendants have waived those issues and the appellate
court should not 'consider them.
. . . Although the Anopols' counsel raised this argument in
their brief on appeal, they neglected to appeal this issue
by filing a notice of appeal and a docketing statement, and
we therefore decline to consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 3
& 9.
Dairvland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut, Auto Ins. Co., 882 P.2d
1143, 1146 (Utah 1994).
Because the issues were not preserved for appeal, they
should not be considered by the Court.

IV.

APPELLANT HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE, THEREFORE FACTUAL
DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BEYOND CHALLENGE.
In Appellants' Brief, Defendants claim that they are asking

the court to review the ultimate conclusions of the trial court
while accepting as correct the findings of fact of the trial
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court.

An obvious difference in standards of review exists

between reviewing conclusions of law and reviewing findings of
fact.

While Defendants appear to acknowledge the difference,

Defendants, in the Appellants' Brief, argue the facts even though
they have not marshalled them.

Regardless of how Defendants

characterize their issues, Appellants' Brief is simply an attempt
to retry this matter before the appellate court based on selected
facts set forth by the Defendants.
What Defendants have done in the case at bar is similar to
what was done by the appellants in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold
Storage et. al.

In its brief, Oneida presented six issues, four

of which were issues of fact and two of which were described as
issues of law.

Upon examination, however, this Court determined

that, in fact, all six issues were issues of fact, and not legal
issues.

The court stated:

In other words, the trial court's dismissal of Metalclad's
damages and liability claims resulted from the trial court's
findings of fact and not from its application,
interpretation, or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida's
characterization, all the issues presented on appeal dispute
the trial court's findings of fact.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah
App. 1994) .
In the case at bar, Appellants' Brief makes it clear that
Defendants are attempting to revisit the factual issues of the
case rather than examine as a matter of law whether the facts
contained within the court's findings support the conclusions of
law made by the trial court.

This is why Appellants' Brief is
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full of citations to various parts of the record, and is
virtually barren of case law.
When an appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the
findings of fact of a trial court, a marshalling standard
applies.

In Oneida the court stated:

Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual
findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy
burden appellants must bear when challenging factual
findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings
of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order
to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty ..., the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists,"
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp v. Granite Mill, 849
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Once appellants have
established every pillar supporting their adversary's
position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the
trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314.
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,'
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at
886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193).
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994).
Because the Defendants are in effect challenging the factual
findings of the trial court, yet have failed to marshall the
evidence, this Court should not consider any factual issues on
appeal.
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If the evidence is not properly marshalled, we will assume
the findings are supported and proceed to review "the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.
Lake Philgas, at 959, quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,
199 (Utah 1991) .

V.

SINCE DEFENDANTS DO NOT ATTACK THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF
FACT, THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT;
NEVERTHELESS, A BRIEF LOOK AT THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT,
IN FACT, THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH IN
TURN SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW.
The trial court concluded that the Defendants were liable

for conversion of the D-7 Caterpillar owned by Plaintiff Max L.
Smith, and conversion of the sheepsfoot owned by Plaintiff Red Z
Inc.

The trial court's Conclusions of Law are reviewed on appeal

for correctness.
1991).

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah

Since Defendants do not contest the trial court's

Findings of Facts, it is assumed that the record supports the
findings of the trial court.

Saunders, 199.

Therefore, what remains is to examine the law regarding
conversion and an application of the law to the trial court's
Conclusions of Law and the application of that law to the facts
as found by the trial court.

However, since the majority of

Defendants' argument focuses on the trial court's Findings of
Fact, brief excerpts from the record will be presented to
demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact are supported
by the record.
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A.

CONVERSION IS AN ACT OF WILFUL INTERFERENCE WITH A
CHATTEL, DONE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION BY WHICH THE
PERSON ENTITLED THERETO IS DEPRIVED OF ITS USE AND
POSSESSION.

Conversion is:
an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is
deprived of its use and possession.
Lake Philcras Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951,
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App 1993) (quoting Phillips v. Utah
State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991) [quoting Allred
v. Hinklev, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958)]).
Interference can be with, not only, ownership rights but also
with rights of possession and use.

Henderson v. For-Shor Co.,

757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
In determining whether the trial court correctly concluded
that Defendants converted the D-7 Caterpillar and the sheepsfoot,
the trial court must find the following elements:
1.
2.
3.

an act of wilful interference by Defendants with
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot;
done without lawful justification;
by which Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and
possession of the D-7 and sheepsfoot.
1.

OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSORY RIGHTS IN THE D-7 AND
SHEEPSFOOT WAS IN THE PLAINTIFFS.

Ownership or possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar and
sheepsfoot must be found in the Plaintiffs as a prerequisite of
conversion by Defendants.

The following Findings of Fact by the

trial court establish that ownership or possessory rights to the
D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot was in the Plaintiffs:
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6.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendant in a
divorce action in this Court, case number 9726. A
decree of divorce was entered in that case on September
30, 1990. Paragraph 25 of that decree reads as
follows:
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use
and possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject
to all liability thereon and holding the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom. The Plaintiff is reserved the
right to use said machinery upon twenty-four (24)
hours notice to the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall
provide her own fuel.

21.

The D-7 Caterpillar which is the subject of this case
is the same one referred to in paragraph 25 of the
decree of divorce in case number 9726. It is equipped
with an in-line 4-cylinder diesel engine which has two
cylinder heads, each covering two cylinders. It is an
older model, probably manufactured in 1954.

23.

The sheepsfoot was purchased by plaintiff J. Fred Smith
in 1982 and later transferred to Red Z, Inc.

24.

On October 14, 1988 Max L. Smith purchased the D-7
Caterpillar from Walker Construction Company. (This
finding was part of the parties' stipulation.) The
purchase price, $5,250.00, was paid by a check signed
by Max L. Smith and drawn on a bank account named
"Oaker Hills."

R. at 358-61.
Based on these Findings of Fact, the trial court correctly stated
in its Conclusions of Law that:
A.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment
against defendants that it is the owner of and is
entitled to possession of the sheepsfoot. Defendants
should be ordered to deliver possession thereof to it
at the property of J. Fred Smith near Indianola, Utah
within 10 days.

B.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment
against defendants that he is entitled to use and
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar. He should be ordered
to designate a location within Utah to which defendants
should be ordered to deliver it within 10 days. Should
Plaintiff Max L. Smith fail to designate a delivery

25

location within 30 days, then he forfeits any ownership
claim he might have.
R. at 369-70.
Although Defendants stated that they do not contest the
trial court's Findings of Fact, and although Defendants failed to
marshal the evidence, Defendants have attempted to argue that the
trial court's finding that Max L. Smith is the owner or has right
to possession of the D-7 goes against the great weight of the
evidence presented at trial.

See Appellants' Brief page 28.

However, the following are some facts from the trial
transcript which support the trial court's finding that ownership
or possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar and Sheepsfoot rest
in the Plaintiffs:
1.

The parties stipulated at the beginning of the trial
that Fred Smith and Red Z, Inc. owned the sheepsfoot
prior to June 15, 1990. Volume 1, page 22, lines 1015.

2.

Fred Smith testified that Red Z, Inc. owned the
sheepsfoot. Vol. 1, pg. 52, Ins. 11-21.

3.

Fred Smith told the Defendant Dominic Bonino, that the
sheepsfoot belonged to Red Z, Inc. Vol 1, pg. 71, Ins.
13-25, pg. 72, Ins. 1-14.

4.

Plaintiff Romona Smith showed Defendant Bonino a bill
of sale. Vol. 2, pg. 83, Ins. 2-12, pg. 84, Ins. 1723.

5.

Plaintiff Romona Smith also believed she showed the
bill of sale to Defendant Shelley. Vol. 2, pg. 84,
Ins. 24-25, pg. 85, Ins. 1-2.

6.

Shelley acknowledged that Plaintiff Romona Smith had
told him that she owned the D-7. Vol. 4, pg. 100, Ins.
22-24.

7.

Defendant Bonino told Defendant Shelley that Defendant
Bonino thought that Plaintiff Max Smith owned the D-7.
Vol. 4, pg. 128, Ins. 13-16.
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8.

Defendant Shelley was told by Andrew Berry that
Plaintiff Max Smith owned equipment. Vol. 4, pg. 128,
In. 25, pg. 129, Ins. 1-2.

9.

Defendant Bonino testified that he was told by Deena
Smith that she and Plaintiff Max Smith owned the D-7
and that Defendant Bonino should contact Plaintiff Max
Smith. Vol. 3, pg. 169, Ins. 12-25, pg. 170, Ins. 113.

10.

Defendant Bonino admitted that Plaintiff Romona Smith
told him that she owned the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 172, Ins.
13-18.

11.

Defendant Bonino admitted that Fred Smith told him that
Fred owned the Sheepsfoot. Vol. 3, pg. 196, Ins. 5-7.

12.

Defendant Bonino admitted in testimony that he knew
that the association did not own the equipment. Vol 3,
pg. 196, Ins. 20-23.

13.

Cummins testified that the association never believed
that it owned the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 127, Ins. 21-23.

14.

Cummins also testified that the association did not
give title to Defendants for the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 128,
Ins. 22-24.

15.

He also testified that the association never took steps
to abandon the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 129, Ins 13-18.

The trial court, therefore, properly found that ownership or
right to possession of the D-7 Caterpillar was in Plaintiff Max
L. Smith, and that ownership in the sheepsfoot was in Plaintiff
Red Z, Inc.
2.

DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS CONSTITUTED WILFUL
INTERFERENCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' D-7 CATERPILLAR AND
SHEEPSFOOT.

After finding that ownership or right to possession is in
the Plaintiffs, it must be found, as an element of conversion,
that Defendants' actions constituted wilful interference with
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot.
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In the following

Findings of Fact, the trial court established that the
Defendants' actions constituted an act of wilful interference by
Defendants with Plaintiffs' D-7 and sheepsfoot:
37.

Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked
Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to
Mr. Shelley's property.

41.

On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelly, assisted by
Mr. Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot
from the Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's
property in Sanpete County, Utah. (This finding was
part of the parties' stipulation.)

42.

Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Dough Shelly
$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment. (This
finding was part of the parties'stipulation.)

51.

Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the
sheepsfoot as of the time of trial.

R. at 365-68.
The following are some facts from the trial transcript which
support the trial court's finding that Defendants' actions
constituted wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar
and sheepsfoot:
1.

Defendant Shelley told Defendant Bonino that Plaintiffs
were willing to pay transportation and storage fees.
Vol. 5, pg. 199, Ins. 7-16.

2.

Defendant Bonino testified that he didn't contact
Plaintiff Max Smith before moving the equipment from
Crystal Mountain. Vol 3, pg. 190. Ins. 3-8.

3.

Defendant Bonino testified that he never received title
to the equipment. Vol. 3, pg. 197, Ins. 19-25.

4.

Cummins testified that Defendants were told that the
Association would assume no liability resulting from
the removal of the equipment. Vol. 3, pg. 127, Ins. 620.

5.

Defendant Bonino told Defendant Shelley that Bonino
owned the equipment. Vol. 4, pg. 128, Ins. 17-24.
28

6.

Defendant Shelley that Plaintiffs Romona Smith and Fred
Smith offered to pay for the equipment and storage.
Vol. 4, pg. 131, Ins. 8-16, Vol. 4, pg. 132, Ins. 5-19.

7.

Defendant Shelley told Defendant Bonino that Plaintiffs
Fred Smith and Romona Smith offered to pay costs. Vol.
4, pg. 132, Ins. 20-25, pg. 133, Ins. 1-4.

The trial court, therefore, correctly found that Defendants'
actions constituted wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7
Caterpillar and sheepsfoot by removing them from the Crystal
Mountain property, taking possession, and refusing to return the
equipment to Plaintiffs.

3.

DEFENDANTS' INTERFERENCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY
WAS DONE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION.

It must next be found, as an element of conversion, that
Defendants' actions, constituting wilful interference with
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot, were done without
lawful justification.

In the following Findings of Fact, the

trial court established that the Defendants' actions were without
lawful justification:
44.

During the first part of October, 1991 defendant
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's
place of business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to
me and Max.
Bonino:
Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up
fee and you can have it back.
Smith:
I can't afford it. You really ought to
call Max. He lives with Romona. Here is
the address and telephone number:....

45.

On October 12 or 15, 1991 plaintiff Romona Smith met
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me.
Bonino:
If you had just come yesterday, it was
sitting right out here in front. I sold
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Smith:
Bonino:
Smith:
Bonino:

it to James Schaefer of Fillmore for
salvage.
Who got the money?
I did.
Who moved it?
Doug Shelley.

Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet
with him, which she did the following day at his place
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on
Mr. Shelley's property on that day.
During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred
Smith met with Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's
place of business. The following conversation
occurred:
Smith:
You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot.
They're not yours. The sheepsfoot
belongs to Red Z, Inc., the Cat belongs
to Romona or Max Smith. We'll pay you
whatever you're into them.
Bonino:
The equipment belongs to me. Ross
Blackham gave me authority. The
equipment has been disposed of.
On that same day, plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with
defendant Dough Shelley at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
That's my cat and my sheepsfoot.
Shelley: I don't think so.
Smith:
I want them back. Will you haul them to
Indianola for me?
On November 6, 1991 Darwin C. Fisher, acting on behalf
of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a
letter and mailed it to defendant Dough Shelley.
Partial text of the letter is as follows:
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot
and ...your continued possession of those items is
wrongful. This letter is to serve you with written
demand to make arrangements for delivery of those
items to the rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred
Smith by November 8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m.
Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr.
Bonino.
68

30

The trial court found that Defendants were not only notified
in person by Plaintiffs that they wrongfully possessed
Plaintiffs' property, but Defendants were also notified of their
wrongful possession of the property when they received the letter
from Plaintiffs' legal counsel informing them of their wrongful
possession and need to return the property promptly.

Defendants

were not only notified of Plaintiff Max L. Smith's ownership or
possessory rights in the D-7 after they assumed control and
possession of the property, but they were also notified prior to
their wrongful interference by Mr. Cummins letter.

The trial

court found that:
36.

On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his nameto a
letter addressed to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant,
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows:
Dear Sir:
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7
Cat from the Crystal Mountain development as soon
as possible. The machine belongs to Max Smith who
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut.

R. at 364.
Most interesting is the fact that Mr. Berry, attorney for
Defendants, knew that ownership or right to possession of the D-7
was in Plaintiff Max L. Smith because Mr. Berry was the same
person who drafted the Divorce Decree in Civil #9726 where
Plaintiff Max L. Smith was awarded possession of the D-7.
Defendants argue that the trial court's Findings of Fact
number 36 supports their argument that Defendants were not
without lawful justification for their interference.

Defendants

argue that the letter from Mr. Cummins was sufficient
authorization to act as they did.
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However, in order to have

received proper authority from Mr. Cummins, Mr. Cummins must
first have had authority.

Mr. Cummins did not have authority to

order removal of the property.

The letter from Mr. Cummins gave

Defendants the right to enter the association's property in order
to remove it and nothing more.

The letter was clear that the

association would not accept liability for removal; thus,
acknowledging they had no right to remove the property.

Had

removal been desired, it was incumbent upon Mr. Cummins to notify
the law enforcement agency whose authority extends to the area
where the item was found.

Consequently, disposition of the

property would have been left to the law enforcement agency.
In the alternative, Defendants argued that they had been
given authority to seize and hold the D-7 and sheepsfoot from the
Sanpete County Attorney.

However, the trial court found that

Defendants failed to present any evidence regarding such
authority.

R. at 369.

Defendants offer 18 Am. Jur. Conversion §63, p. 197 to argue
that Plaintiffs should have demanded the property and shown
ownership rights or authorization to act on behalf of the owner.
That section states that a demand and refusal may be necessary to
constitute a conversion.

Defendants argue that they could not

turn over the property without a demand and proof of ownership or
agency authority from Plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith.
This argument is inconsistent in two respects.

First, how

is it that Defendants needed identification or proof of authority
from Plaintiffs when Defendants were aware that the property
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belonged to Plaintiffs?

Second, had the proof of authority

really been the reason for refusing to return the property, why
did Defendants inform Plaintiffs, the first time Plaintiffs
contacted them regarding the property, that regardless of
Plaintiffs rights in the property, they had already sold and
disposed of the property?
Interestingly, 18 Am. Jur. Conversion, §63, p. 197, also
states that a demand is necessary unless there is an assumption
of ownership, wrongful use, or any act of conversion prior to the
demand.

Defendants fail to recognize that the trial court

specifically found the existence of these circumstances in the
case at bar.
The trial court specifically noted that the first demand for
the property by Plaintiffs was made to Defendant Domonic Bonino
by Plaintiff Romona Smith.
On October 12 or 15, 1991, Plaintiff Romona Smith met with
Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of business.
The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me.
Bonino:
If you had just come yesterday, it was
sitting right out here in front. I sold it
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage.
Smith:
Who got the money?
Bonino:
I did.
Smith:
Who moved it?
Bonino:
Doug Shelley.
R. at 366-67.
The trial court specifically noted a second demand for the
property by Plaintiffs.
During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred Smith
met with Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter7s place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
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Smith:

Bonino:

You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z,
Inc., the Cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith.
We'll pay you whatever you're into them.
The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham
gave me authority. The equipment has been
disposed of.

R. at 367.
Note, that after each demand, Plaintiffs were informed that
the property had been sold or disposed of; thereby, Defendants
demonstrated an act of conversion, negating the need for a
demand.
Defendants' failure to return Plaintiffs' property upon
demand resulted in a wilful interference without lawful
justification.

The only justification which Defendants might

have had may have been a lien on the costs for moving the
property.

However, the trial court found that Defendants were

offered reimbursement for their expenses and storage fees.
Smith:

You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z,
Inc., the Cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith.
We'll pay you whatever you're into them.

R. at 367.
Further, the Defendants did nothing to properly perfect any lien
they may have had on the property.
The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that
Defendants' wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar
and sheepsfoot by removing them from the Crystal Mountain
property, taking possession, and refusing to return the equipment
to Plaintiffs was without lawful justification.

34

4.

PLAINTIFFS WERE DEPRIVED OF THE USE AND POSSESSION
OF THE D-7 AND SHEEPSFOOT.

It must next be found, as the final element of conversion,
that Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot.

In the following Findings of Fact,

the trial court established that the Plaintiffs were deprived of
the use and possession of the equipment:
53.

On August 13, 1991 the sheepsfoot was worth $2,800.00,
the D-7 Caterpillar was worth $1,300.00. On the last
day of trial the respective values were $2,800.00 and
$0.00.

54.

During 1991 and 1992 the rental value of a sheepsfoot
was $600.00 per month.

55.

In 1991 plaintiff Red Z, Inc. entered into a contract
with an entity known as Garff Brothers to do road
construction work in Summit County, Utah,

56.

Road construction work in Summit County is seasonal due
to adverse weather conditions.

57.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. could have used the sheepsfoot
during the months of August and September 1991 and May,
June, July, August and September 1992 on the Summit
County project.

58.

Plaintiffs filed this action in January of 1992 in
order to regain possession of their property. They
retained counsel to assist them, and he has assisted
them in this case. His fees are reasonable in the sum
of $9981.25.

59.

Defendants claimed authority to seize and hod the
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no
evidence regarding such authority was presented.

60.

The number of days between September 30, 1992 and
September 8, 1993 is 344.

R. at 368-69.
The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that
Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D-7
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Caterpillar and sheepsfoot from August 13, 1991, to the date of
the trial.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW IS SUPPORTED BY THE
FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.

As indicated by the preceding analysis, even without the
presumption that the Findings of Fact are supported by the
record, the trial court's conclusion that Defendants converted
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot is correct.

The trial

court's Findings of Fact support the Conclusion of Law, and the
facts produced at trial support the trial court's Findingrs of
Fact.

Ownership or possessory rights in the property was in the

Plaintiffs; Defendants exercised dominion and control over the
property without justification and inconsistent with the
Plaintiffs' rights; and, Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and
possession of the equipment for a significant period of time.
The trial court also properly found that the Defendants acted
knowingly and with disregard of the Plaintiffs' ownership or
possessory rights.

VI.

DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE PRECLUDES AN
ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
As stated in Appellants' Brief, punitive damages require a

showing and finding of acts that are a result of willful or
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that
manifests a reckless indifference toward the rights of others.
Defendants attack the trial court's award of punitive damages.
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Beginning on page 35 of Appellants' Brief, Defendants set
forth ten pages of selected facts from the record and from other
documents and cases in an effort to support their argument that
punitive damages are not warranted in this case.

However,

Defendants have failed to marshall all evidence in favor of the
above listed facts found by the trial court in order to properly
attack the trial court's award of punitive damages.
In order to attack a trial court's fact findings, "an
appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts
as found by the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d
198, 199 (Utah 1991). If the evidence is not properly
marshalled, we will assume the findings are supported and
proceed to review "the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case." Ld. Valley Bank has failed to marshall the evidence
supporting the above quoted finding or other findings of the
court which further support this finding. We therefore
assume there is sufficient evidence in the record to support
the court's findings that Valley Bank's conduct was willful
and intentional.
Lake Philgas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 959
(Utah App. 1993).
Similarly, Defendants' failure to marshall the facts, and
Defendants' attempt to offer carefully selected facts in their
own favor preclude any attack on the trial court's findings and
conclusions that Defendants acted willfully and maliciously.

VII. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL RECORD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS WERE WILLFUL AND
MALICIOUS•
In deciding whether punitive damages should be awarded the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Such damages may be awarded "where the nature of the wrong
complained of and the injury inflicted goes beyond merely
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violating the rights of another in that it is found to be
willful and malicious."
Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d
37 (1980); Kesler v. Rogers, supra, note 7; Prince v.
Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975).
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., et
al., 653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982).
Furthermore,
The purposes of punitive damages are well stated in Kesler
v. Rogers. They are: a punishment of the defendant for
particularly grievous injury caused by conduct which is not
only wrongful, but which is wilful and malicious so that it
seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense for
actual loss is inadequate and that the plaintiff should have
added compensation; and that the defendant should suffer
some additional penalty for that character of wrongful
conduct; and also that such a verdict should serve as a
wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar
misdoings. 542 P.2d at 359. Accord Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 267 (1982).
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (Utah
1982) .
The legal standard for awarding punitive damages is fact-specific
"such that the determination as to whether punitive damages are
awarded is 'within the sound discretion and province of the
jury;'11 or, in this case, the court.

Mark VII Financial

Consultants Corp. v. Smedley and First National Bank of Lavton,
792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)(citing Biswell v. Duncan,
742 P.2d 80, 86 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ) .
The following findings and conclusions by the trial court
support the trial court's award of punitive damages in the case
at bar:
36.

On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a
letter addressed to "Mountainvilie Ent., Mt. Pleasant,
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows:
Dear Sir:
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You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut.
Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked
Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to
Mr. Shelley's property.
On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelley, assisted Mr.
Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot from
the Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's
property in Sanpete County, Utah. (This finding was
part of the parties' stipulation.)
Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Doug Shelley
$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment.
(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.)
On September 30, 1991, plaintiffs were in court in
Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr.
Berry say, "...There's already been heavy machinery
that's been lost by Mr. Smith's inattentiveness, and he
left a piece, a D7-Cat on a mountain and it's been
taken off the mountain by the State of Utah; and I'm
not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect it's
gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..."
During the first part of October, 1991 defendant
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's
place of business. The following conversation
occurred:
Smith:
Did you pick up the Cat?
and Max.

It belongs to me

Bonino:
Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee
and you can have it back.
Smith:

I can't afford it. You really ought to call
me Max. He lives with Romona.
Here is the address and telephone
number.

On October 12 or 15, 1991 Plaintiff Romona Smith met
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me.
Bonino:

If you had just come yesterday, it was
sitting right out here in front. I sold it
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage.
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Smith:

Who got the money?

Bonino:

I did.

Smith:

Who moved it?

Bonino:

Doug Shelley.

46.

Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet
with him, which she did the following day at his place
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on
Mr. Shelley's property on that day.

47.

During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred
Smith met with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's
place of business, The following conversation
occurred:
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49.

Smith:

You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z,
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith.
We'll pay you whatever you're into them.

Bonino:

The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham
gave me authority. The equipment has been
disposed of.

On that same day, Plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with
defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:

That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot.

Shelley:

I don't think so.

Smith:

I want them back.
Indianola for me?

Will you haul them to

On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf
of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a
letter and mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley.
Partial text of the letter is as follows:
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your
continued possession of those items is wrongful. This
letter is to serve you with written demand to make
arrangements for delivery of those items to the
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m.
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50.

Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr.
Bonino.

51.

Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the
sheepsfoot as of the time of trial.

59.

Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no
evidence regarding such authority was presented.

A.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment
against defendants that it is the owner of and is
entitled to possession of the sheepsfoot. Defendants
should be ordered to deliver possession thereof to it
at the property of J. Fred Smith near Indianola, Utah
within 10 days.

B.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgement
against defendants that he is entitled to use and
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar. He should be
ordered to deliver it within 10 days. Should plaintiff
Max L. Smith fail to designate a delivery location
within 3 0 days, then he forfeits any ownership claims
he might have.

C.

Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay
money to it as follows:
1.
the sum of $4,800.00 (this sum represents eight
months' rent on the sheepsfoot);
2.
the sum of $5,600.00 (this sum represents double
the value of the sheepsfoot; it is intended as
punitive damages and is imposed to punish
defendants for their willful and malicious acts) ;
3.
the sum of $ 258.76 (this sum represents prejudgment interest on $4,800.00 from September 30,
1992 to September 8, 1993, calculated as follows:
$4,800.00 times 5.72% times 344 divided by 365).

D.

Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay to
him the sum of $3,900.00 (this sum represents triple
the value of the D-7 as of August 13, 1991; it is
intended as punitive damages and is imposed to punish
defendants for their willful and malicious acts).

E.

Plaintiffs Red Z, Inc. and Max L. Smith should be
awarded judgment and defendants and they should be
ordered to pay to them the sum of $ 9981.25
(representing attorney's fees).
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F.

Defendant should be ordered to pay interest on the
total judgment at the statutory interest rate.

G.

The judgment should be augmented by the amount of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred to collect it.

H.

Plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment of "no cause of
action" against the defendants as to each claim made in
their counterclaim.

R. at 364-71.
These findings and conclusions support the trial court's finding
of willful and malicious conduct by Defendants, which justifies
punitive damages.

Further, when reviewing the trial court's

award of punitive damages the appellate courts:
give adequate deference to the advantaged position of the
trial judge to appraise the witnesses and the evidence.
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 p.2d 809, 811 (Utah
1991) .
Based on the findings and conclusions listed above, the
trial court found, and the record supports, that Defendants'
conduct was willful and malicious warranting the imposition of
punitive damages.
In determining the amount of punitive damages, the fact
finder should consider the following factors:
the nature of the alleged misconduct of the defendant, the
extent of the effect of the misconduct on the lives of the
plaintiff and others, the probability of future recurrence
of such misconduct, the relationship between the parties,
the relative wealth of the defendant, the facts and
circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the amount of
actual damages awarded.
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. at 599.
Defendants argue that the trial court did not consider these
seven factors in assessing punitive damages, and that it did not
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enter findings supporting the amount of punitive damages awarded.
However, Defendants have failed to marshall all evidence, which
marshalling would show that the record contains sufficient facts
regarding the seven factors on which the trial court could base
its decision.

The trial court is not required to list the seven

factors as findings of fact.

It is sufficient that facts

regarding the factors are contained in the record.

Arnica Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct.App.
1989) .
Further,
The trial court has broad discretion in weighing these
factors and determining an appropriate award, and we will
not disturb its conclusions absent an abuse of discretion.
See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,
312 (Utah 1982) .
Id. at 967.
Punitive damages, and the amount imposed by the trial court,
were supported by the trial court's findings of fact, which were
supported by substantial record evidence.
Further, the above cited findings and conclusions also
support the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
As a general rule, a prevailing party to a lawsuit is not
entitled to attorney fees unless there is a contractual or
statutory basis for the award. Some courts have recognized
an exception to the general rule by allowing a plaintiff to
recover attorney fees incurred in regaining possession of
converted property. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion s 120
(1985); Gladstone v. Hillel, 203 Cal.App.3d 977, 250
Cal.Rptr. 372, 380-81 (1988); Motors Ins. Corp. v.
Singleton, 677 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Ky.Ct.App.1984).
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993).
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Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 states:
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith....
Two conditions must be met to qualify under this statute.

First,

the claim must be without merit, and second, it must be asserted
in bad faith.
To establish that a claim is "without merit", a party must
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or "of little
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact.

Jeschke v.

Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) . Asserting a claim
or defense knowing that it has no basis in law or fact evidences
a disregard for the truth and a lack of an honest belief in the
propriety of the assertion.

In other words, it lacks good faith.

In Jeschke. the trial court determined, and this Court affirmed,
that:
Jeschke knew he had no factual
Jeschke's purposeful disregard
misrepresentations of material
lacked an honest belief in the

basis for his claims.
for truth and his
facts evidences that he
propriety of his activities.

Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial court found that
Defendants knew they had no factual basis for their claims, and
their defense was a purposeful disregard for the truth.
Beginning with the first communication to Defendants
concerning the property, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs owned
the property.
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36.

On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a
letter addressed to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant,
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows:
Dear Sir:
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut.

44.

During the first part of October, 1991 defendant
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's
place of business. The following conversation
occurred:
Smith:
Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to me
and Max.
Bonino:
Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee
and you can have it back.
Smith:

I can't afford it. You really ought to call
me Max. He lives with Romona. Here is the
address and telephone number.

R. at 364, 366.
When the Defendants were approached by Plaintiffs, and even
contacted by Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendants, with calloused
attitude, dismissed Plaintiffs' efforts to recover the property,
including offers to pay recovery and transportation costs, and
manifested a blatant disregard for Plaintiffs' rights.
45.

On October 12 or 15, 1991 plantiff Romona Smith met
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:
You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me.
Bonino:

If you had just come yesterday, it was
sitting right out here in front. I sold it
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage.

Smith:

Who got the money?

Bonino:

I did.

Smith:

Who moved it?

Bonino:

Doug Shelley.
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46.

Plantiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet
with him, which she did the following day at his place
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on
Mr. Shelley's property on that day.

47.

During the deer-hunt time of 1991 plantiff J. Fred
Smith met with defedant Domonic Bonino at the latter's
place of business. The following conversation
occurred:

48.

Smith:

You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z,
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith.
We'll pay you whatever you're into them.

Bonino:

The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham
gave me authority. The equipment has been
disposed of.

On that same day, plantiff J. Fred Smith met with
defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of
business. The following conversation occurred:
Smith:

That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot.

Shelley:

I don't think so.

Smith:

I want them back.
Indianola for me?

Will you haul them to

49.

On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf
of plantiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a
letter and mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley.
Partial text of the letter is as follows:
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your
continued possession of those items is wrongful. This
letter is to serve you with written demand to make
arrangements for delivery of those items to the
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m.

50.

Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr.
Bonino.

R. at 366-68.
Not only were Defendants aware from the outset that Plaintiffs
owned the property, in fact, their own attorney knew of
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Plaintiffs' ownership or possessory rights because he was counsel
in the proceedings in Civil #9726 in which Plaintiff Max L. Smith
was awarded possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar.
6.

Plantiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendent in a
divorce action in this Court, case number 9726. A
decree of divorce was entered in that case on September
30, 1990. Paragraoh 25 of that decree reads as
follows:
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use
and possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject
to all liability thereon and holding the Plantiff
harmless therefrom. The Plantiff is reserved the
right to use said machinery upon twenty-four (24)
hours notice to the Defendant. The Plantiff shall
provide her own fuel.

43.

On September 30, 1991, plantiffs were in court in
Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr.
Berry say, "...There's already been heavy machinery
that's been lost by Mr. Smith's inattentiveness, and he
left a piece, a D7-Cat on a mountain and it's been
taken off the mountain by the State of Utah; and I'm
not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect it's
gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..."

R. at 358, 366.
Recognizing their position, Defendants even tried to claim
authority from the County Attorney, however, the trial court
found that there was no evidence supporting their claim.
59.

Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no
evidence regarding such authority was presented.

R. at 369.
Defendants' claim to the property had no factual or legal
basis.

Their actions, coupled with the fact that their attorney

also knew that their defense was without merit and that asserting
it lacked good faith, also demonstrate that Defendants and their
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attorney intended or had knowledge that their conduct would
defraud Plaintiffs of their property.

Nevertheless, Defendants,

assisted by their attorney, asserted their defense evidencing
their purposeful disregard for the truth and lack of an honest
belief in the propriety of their assertion.

The record

supported, and the trial court correctly found, that Defendants'
defense was without merit, and Defendants lacked good faith in
asserting it.
Ordinarily, if upon review of the record, this Court is able
to find any legal basis for the trial court's award, we will
affirm. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,
894-95 (Utah 1988) .
Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 p.2d 950, 965 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989) .
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
sufficiently support its determination that Defendants' claim was
without merit and lacked good faith.

VIII.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES ON
APPEAL.

An appeal brought from an action which is properly
determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under
Utah R. App. P. 33.
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 p.2d 1193 (Utah Ct.App.
1991) .
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
for purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact,
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
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Defendants7 claim was properly found by the trial court to be
without merit and lacking in good faith.

Defendants' appeal is

not grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and does
not attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
Defendants' appeal is necessarily frivolous, and Plaintiffs are
entitled to recover attorneys fees resulting from Defendants'
appeal.

CONCLUSION
Issues 7(b) and 7(e) on Defendants' docketing statement are
waived for failure to brief the issues on appeal.
Paragraphs 2 and 6 on page 2 of Appellants' Brief contain
two issues which Defendants did not properly preserve for appeal
which results in Defendants waiving them.
Since Defendants do not contest the trial court's Findings
of Fact, it is assumed that the record supports the findings of
the trial court.

Furthermore, since Defendants have failed to

marshal the evidence to attack the trial court's Findings of
Fact, the trial court's Findings of Fact are accepted as valid
and to be supported by the weight of the evidence.
The findings and conclusions support the trial court's
determination that Defendants willfully and maliciously converted
Plaintiffs' property.

These findings and conclusions are well
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supported by record evidence and justify punitive damages and
attorneys fees as awarded by the trial court.
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court affirm the
decision of the trial court.
DATED THIS

^>fl^day of May, 1995.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C,

Darwin C. Fisher
Donald E. McCandless
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following this
May, 1995:
Andrew B. Berry, Jr.
62 West Main Street
Moroni, UT 84646-0600
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Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355.

78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing
inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing,
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of 'this act" — See note following same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except
under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not
otherwise provided by statute or agreement"

following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); substituted "shall" for "may" following "the court"
in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsection (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added
Subsection (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Discretion of court.
Essential elements.
Findings.
Frivolous appeal.
Hearing.
State of mind.
A

"Without merit" and "good faith."
Cited.
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer.
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not
show the bad faith necessary for an award under this section. Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989).
An
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150.

Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 941.
C.J.S. — 5 C .J.S. Appeal and Error § 995.
ATT*
T^ A r
i- i - A x
J
A L.R. - Date from which interest on judgment starts running, as affected by modification of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
A.L.R.3d 1221.
Right to interest, pending appeal, of judg-

ment creditor appealing unsuccessfully on
grounds of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411.
Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Retrospective application and effect of state
s t a t u t e o r ro,e a l l o w i n g i n t e r e s t o r c h a n g i n g
r a t e o f i n t e r e s t on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Key Numbers. — Interest *» 39(2).

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.

